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I Book Review
Modem British Family Law in One
Accessible Volume by Mary Welstead &
Susan Edwards, Family Law (Oxford
University Press 2006) (available at
www.bn.com for $35.00 ($31.50 for
members plus shipping)
Reviewed by Robert E. Rains*
Professors Mary Welstead and Susan Edwards have produced a
lucid and lively explanation of British family law in their concise (358-
page) new book, simply titled, Family Law.1 This book is must read for
anyone who wants a good understanding of modem British family law.
Additionally, any law student, professor, or family lawyer who simply
wants a better understanding of American family law and the forces that
are shaping and reshaping it would do well to read this work.
Evolving from the same Anglo-Saxon common law traditions, Great
* Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Family Law Clinic, the Dickinson
School of law of the Pennsylvania State University. Professor Rains also holds the title
of Visiting Professor at the University of Buckingham Law School, the home institution
of the authors of Family Law.
1. MARY WELSTEAD & SUSAN EDWARDS, FAMILY LAW 1-7 (Nicola Padfield ed.,
Oxford University Press 2006).
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Britain and the United States face many similar issues in domestic
relations matters in the early Twenty-First Century: large numbers of
children born out of wedlock, high divorce rates, single parent
households, demands of gays and lesbians for legal recognition of their
unions countered by cries of moral indignation from certain quarters,
underreporting and overreporting of child abuse, and the sometimes life-
and-death issues of the autonomy of teens to make medical decisions.2
Both the United States and Great Britain have become state parties to
certain international agreements relating to domestic relations matters,
notably: the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction,3 and the Hague Convention on the Protection of
Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption.4 Both
of our countries have become increasingly multi-cultural over the past
few decades, creating difficult issues of recognition of family
relationships outside of prior norms.
Of course, there are also substantial differences between the two
legal landscapes. For instance, Great Britain has state religion.
Although the legal fact is not universally accepted by certain politicians
today, the United States does not,6 and individual states do not, have any
official religion.7 Moreover, Great Britain is more multicultural than
many regions of the United States, and consequently must give legal
recognition to family relations beyond our norm, partly as a result of the
Commonwealth which evolved out of its Empire. Thus, for example:
"[b]igamous or polygamous marriages may, in certain circumstances, be
recognized by English law. Such marriages are also socially accepted;
the Queen invited the Sultan of Brunei and both his wives, as her guests,
to the wedding of her youngest child in l999:",8
Like all countries except Somalia and the United States, Great
Britain has joined. the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (UNCRC) 1989.9 While this Convention is largely aspirational
2. See generally id.
3. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Dec.
23, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 89.
4. Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1134. Technically, the
United States has signed this Convention, and the Senate has authorized its ratification.
See U.S. Department of State, Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption and the
Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000: Background, http://www.travel.state.gov/family/
adoption/convention/convention_2290.html?css=print (last visited Apr. 10, 007).
5. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 15-16.
6. But see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892)
(stating that "[tihis is a Christian nation").
7. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985).
8. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 11.
9. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, reprinted
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and unenforceable, Great Britain has also adopted its Human Rights Act
(HRA) 1998,0 thereby effectively incorporating the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950"1 into British Law:
The implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 requires that
family law complies with the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (ECHR 1950).
Challenges and fears of challenges under the Convention are a
constant theme throughout the case law. They have also triggered
reviews of law, and brought about dramatic changes in legislation
such as the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the Civil Partnership
Act 2004, both of which have given significant rights and
responsibilities to previously excluded familial partners.' 2
Family Law is divided into sixteen chapters. The first eight focus
on adult rights and responsibilities, while the remaining eight focus on
children. 13  Topics range from "state intervention in personal
relationships," 14 to "nullity and its consequences,"' 5 to "acquisition of
rights in the family home,',' 6 to "domestic violence,"'17 to adoption and
children's welfare. 18 Each chapter ends with a list of recommended
readings. Most chapters also have self-test questions for readers to test
their understanding of key concepts.
The work is up-to-date, incorporating such significant new
legislation as the Gender Recognition Act (GRA) 200419 and the Civil
Partnership Act (CPA) 2004.20 It is particularly useful that both of these
statutory initiatives are integrated throughout the text, rather than treated
as merely specialized or peculiar subjects.
American readers will find Family Law highly accessible because it
is written for both lawyers and educated lay people. The reader comes
across many familiar names, people whom he may or may not admire,
who nevertheless enrich the tapestry of family law. There are cameo
appearances by Prince Charles and the Duchess of Cornwall,2' Woody
in 28 I.L.M. 1448.
10. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.).
11. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
12. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, SUpra note 1, at 7.
13. See id. at 7.
14. See id. at 9-22.
15. See id. at 26-45.
16. See id. at 48-67.
17. See id. at 71-86.
18. See id. at 161-186; 191-216; 219-244; 247-265; 271-291; 295-318; 321-340;
343-357.
19. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (Eng.) (enacted July 1, 2004).
20. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33 (Eng.).
21. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 15.
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Allen and Soon Yi Previn (with Mia and Andre Previn lurking in the
background),22 Mick Jagger and Jerry Hall,23 and, of course, Angelina
Jolie.24 Welstead and Edwards draw not only upon legal sources, but
also upon past and current sociological and economic texts, novels, and
movies. Sources range from Engels' The Origin of the Family, Private
Property and the State,25 to the German poet Rainer Maria Rilke, 26 to
Alice Walker's The Colour Purple,27 to films such as Kramer v.
Kramer28 and Bend It Like Beckham.29 Helpfully, the authors frequently
provide websites for accessing primary and updated information.3 °
Of course, there are Britishisms, most of which are readily
understandable. The authors use "whilst"'3 1 for while, "humour ' 32 for
humor, and "hotchpotch ' 33 for hodgepodge. Occasionally, a British
usage may stymie, or intrigue, the American reader. In a case involving
an award of periodic payments to an ex-wife, the reader is told that
Arsenal footballer (soccer player) Ray Parlour subsequently played for
England and was capped ten times.34 It took further research to ascertain
that when an English footballer plays for the mother country (as against
such traditional enemies as Wales, Ireland and Scotland), he receives a
cap, much as an American footballer might receive a Superbowl Ring.
This text is a serious and important description of current British
family law, but the authors do not hesitate to critique (sometimes
harshly) the state of that law. The reader encounters such criticisms as
the "court suggested, rather bizarrely and almost certainly incorrectly"
that "a violent petitioner can reasonably be expected to live with a
violent respondent' 35 and, elsewhere, that a certain judge held, "rather
obtusely," that a Hindu ceremony created something which was "not a
marriage of any kind at all, not even a marriage which was void.,
36
Part of the joy of reading this serious work is the authors'
recognition (and sometimes retelling) of the fascinating stories of family
life and the black humor that, so frequently, is to be found in them.
22. Id. at 29.
23. Id. at 31.
24. Id. at 198.
25. Id. at 162.
26. Id. at 159.
27. Id. at 333.
28. Id. at 248.
29. Id. at 226.
30. See, e.g., id. at 39.
31. See, e.g., id. at 37.
32. See, e.g., id. at 1.
33. Id. at 109.
34. See id. at 118-19 (discussing Parlour v. Parlour [2004] 2 FLR 893).
35. Id. at 95-96 (discussing Ash v. Ash [1972] Fam 135).
36. Id. at 31 (discussing Gandhi v. Patel [2002] 1 FLR 63).
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There is the wife who convinced the Ontario Supreme Court that the
family yacht was an alternative family home so that she was entitled to
an order giving her periods of occupation subject to the vagaries of
weather at sea.37 Another wife claimed that for fourteen years she did
not know that her husband was a transsexual who had been using a
sexual prosthesis to simulate intercourse with her; after all, she said, he
always backed out of the shower. 38 Then, there is the husband whose
"genius and stellar qualities extended to the manufacture of plastic bin
liners which revolutionized the collection of household waste, and to a
certain creativity in his dealings with the Inland Revenue. ' '39 There is the
court faced with a contract between two male cohabitants whereby one (a
wealthy businessman) agreed to give the other (an airline steward and
male prostitute) all of his financial assets to become his sexual slave.
40
Not surprisingly, the court found the contract to be unenforceable. 4 '
As in the United States, many British family law cases involve
situations tinged with tragedy where there are competing interests that
can never be satisfactorily resolved by the legal system. Consider the
following case of in vitro fertilization gone awry where the British court
endeavored to create a Solomon-like solution:
[T]he ruling that "the legal relationship of parenthood should not be
based on a fiction" in cases of artificial insemination was not
followed in Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust v. Mr. and Mrs. A
and others (2003), a case where a white couple were undergoing IVF
treatment and gave birth to mixed race twins, because there had been
a sperm donor mix up. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, President, ruled
that the black sperm donor was to be the legal father, although the
twins would actually live with their white mother and her husband.
This apparently bizarre outcome ... perpetuated a fiction, albeit that
the HFEA rules had been correctly applied, since parental status
could not be conferred on a husband whose wife had given birth after
in vitro fertilization treatment because he had neither consented to the
placing in his wife of the embryo which was actually placed in error
nor had the couple undergone treatment together within the meaning
of the Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act 1990.42
Often, Family Law holds a mirror up to American law and society.
37. See id. at 66 (discussing Clark v. Clark (1984) 26AWCS (2d) 275).
38. Id. at 134 (discussing J v S-T (formerly J) (Transsexual: Ancillary Relief)
(1995]).
39. Id. at 132-33 (discussing Cowan v. Cowan [2001] 2 FLR 192).
40. See id. at 139 (discussing Sutton v. Mishcon de Reya and Gawor & Co. [2004] 1
F.L.R. 837).
41. See id.
42. Id. at 174-75 (discussing R (A Child) (IVF: Paternity of a Child), Re [2005]
UKHL 33).
2007]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
As with most American states, the United Kingdom does not recognize
the concept of common law marriage. Indeed, England abolished
common law marriage over two-hundred and fifty years ago, in 1753. 43
Yet, as in the United States, the word has been slow to spread about the
abolishment of common law marriage. Welstead and Edwards cite a
report from 2001-2002 in which 57% of British people were found to
believe that common law marriage still exists in Great Britain and that it
bears the same rights as a formal marriage.4 (If this is what a majority
of the British population believes two-and-a-half centuries after Great
Britain abandoned common law marriage, how long will it take most
Pennsylvanians to realize that their General Assembly likewise has
abolished common law marriage for any such relationship entered into
after 2004?)
45
The book also explores many issues of British family law that have
direct parallels in American family law. For instance, just as the United
States has struggled with issues of matching adoptive children with
adoptive parents of their same ethnic background,46 so has the United
Kingdom. Consider the Adoption and Children Act (ACA) 200247 and
the troublesome case of a child identified in court only as "C":
The ACA 2002 places emphasis on the importance of religious
persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background in the
process of matching adoptive parents to children placed for adoption.
Perfect matching is not an exact science and it is clearly impossible to
match the several variables.
In Re C (Adoption: Religious Observance) (2002), a child of a mixed
background with Jewish, Irish Roman Catholic, and Turkish-Cypriot
Muslim elements was placed for adoption with a Jewish couple. The
guardian for the child issued proceedings for judicial review of the
local authority's decision to place the child with the Jewish couple,
arguing that the couple was unsuitable on the basis that they were too
Jewish and that C should be placed in an essentially secular home.
The court held that where a child's heritage was very mixed, it would
rarely be possible for this heritage be reflected in the identity of the
adoptive home. Judge Wilson explained:
As society becomes increasingly complex with children often
having diverse ethnicity and cultures in their background, it is
43. Id. at 17.
44. Id.
45. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 1103 (2004).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b) (2007).
47. Adoption and Children Act, 2002, c. 38 (Eng.).
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even more important that social workers should avoid labeling a
child and ignoring some elements of his background. Children
of mixed origin should be helped to understand and take pride
in all elements in their racial heritage and feel comfortable
about their origins.48
Welstead and Edwards explore the famous Gillick case of 1986,49 in
which the House of Lords ruled that a competent child's right to
determine her own treatment (in that case oral contraceptives) prevailed
over her parents' right to determine the issue on her behalf. American
lawyers and law students will surely recognize echoes of the United
States Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Carey v. Population Services,
50
striking down New York's ban on distribution of contraceptives to
minors. There is also a fascinating discussion of post-Gillick cases in
which British courts have struggled to determine whether a child is
"Gillick-competent" to make certain critical decisions, such as refusing
consent to life preserving medical treatments. 5 1 Again, this parallels the
line of American cases on a minor's right to an abortion in a judicial
bypass proceeding if the court deems her to be competent to give
informed consent.52
Sometimes the prose literally sparkles. Consider the following
passage concerning the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1970:51
The symbol of any committed relationship is often a ring. Although
an engagement ring is normally a gift given in contemplation of
marriage, § 3(2) of the Act provides that it may only be recovered by
the donor if it was made on the express or implied condition that it
must be returned if the engagement is ended by either party.
54
This concept is illustrated by the case of Cox v Jones (2004):
5 5
Mr. Jones and Miss Cox, who were both barristers, became engaged
in 1998. Mr. Jones claimed that he told Miss Cox that, if their
engagement came to an end, she must return the ring, which was
valued at around £10,000. After the engagement ended, Miss Cox
48. Id. at 202 (discussing C (Adoption: Religious Observance), Re [2002] 1 FLR
1119).
49. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Health Authority [1986] A.C. 112.
50. Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
51. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 183-84, 188, 227, 229-34, 236-37, 239-
40, 242-43, 24445, 251-53, 268, 314-15.
52. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); In re L.D.F., 820 A.2d
714 (Pa. Super. 2003).
53. Law Reforrm (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, c. 33 (Eng.).
54. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 141.
55. Cox v. Jones [2004] 2 FLR 1010.
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requested a jeweler to set the stone from the ring into a pendant
which was valued at £18,000. The court had little difficulty in
rejecting Mr. Jones' version of events. It found it implausible that
any fianc6 could express such an unromantic remark.56
This ambivalence of British family law regarding return of the
engagement ring is reflective of the dispute within and among American
jurisdictions on the subject. In 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
split 4-3 on the subject, with the majority ruling that an engagement ring
is a conditional gift, conditioned on the marriage actually taking place, so
that the ring must be returned-no questions asked-if the wedding is
called off by either party for any, or no, reason.57 The majority called
this no-fault approach "the modem trend.' '58 Three years later, however,
the Supreme Court of Montana rejected this approach in toto, reasoning
as follows:
Albinger (the ring giver) urges the Court to adopt a conditional gift
theory patterned on the law relevant to a gift in view of death. Under
Montana law, no gift is revocable after acceptance except a gift in
view of death. While some may find marriage to be the end of life as
one knows it, we are reluctant to analogize gifts in contemplation of
marriage with a gift in contemplation of death. This Court declines
the invitation to create a new category by judicial fiat.
59
As in the United States, in Great Britain one of the great issues of
family law is the appropriate role of fault in the divorce process. Great
Britain was a catalyst for the no-fault divorce revolution with the 1966
report for the Archbishop of Canterbury entitled Putting Asunder, which
recommended marriage breakdown as the sole ground for divorce.6°
Nevertheless, four decades later, divorce, according to Welstead and
Edwards, is one of the more stress-inducing experiences of life and may
be exacerbated by the primarily fault-based nature of the divorce
process.61 The authors walk the reader through both the special
procedure for divorce in which the parties are able to resolve their
differences amicably, and contested petitions in which the parties are
unable to agree. Despite the fact that irretrievable breakdown is the only
grounds for divorce, a host of interesting rules apply even where the
56. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 141 (discussing Cox v. Jones [2004 2
FLR 1010).
57. Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643 (Pa. 1999).
58. Id. at 646.
59. Albinger v. Harris, 48 P.3d 711, 719 (Mont. 2002).
60. See, e.g., LYNNE CAROL HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND
SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 237 (1980).
61. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 90.
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parties are in agreement as to the divorce.62 They must have been
married at least one year.63 The petitioner must establish one of five
facts laid down in the Matrimonial Causes Act (MCA) 1973.64 Three of
these facts are clearly fault-laden: adultery, unreasonable behavior and
desertion. 65 Two are no-fault: two years living apart with both parties
consenting to the divorce' and five years living apart without the
respondent's consent to divorce.66 Even this last stopgap basis for
divorce may be blocked where the respondent demonstrates that divorce
will result in grave financial or other hardship to her, and that in all the
circumstances it would be wrong to dissolve the marriage.67 As Welstead
and Edwards point out, however, no respondent pleading non-financial
grave hardship has ever succeeded.68
Depending on one's point of view, some aspects of British family
law are more advanced, or more radical, than American law. The
Gender Recognition Act 200469 allows transsexuals to obtain gender
recognition certificates from the government, officially recognizing (for
almost all purposes) their acquired gender. There is no comparable
legislation in any American state, and most state appellate courts which
have addressed the subject have refused to recognize a marriage between
a post-operative transsexual and a person of his or her original gender.7°
The Civil Partnership Act (CPA) 2004 allows same-sex couples to be
married in all but name. (Sir Elton John and his long-time partner were
among the first to take advantage of the CPA.).71 The CPA is akin to the
law for civil unions in Vermont,72 but does not go as far as
Massachusetts' recognition of same-sex marriage per se.73 However, the
CPA provides far more protection for same-sex couples than that granted
by the United States government with its Defense of Marriage" Act, 74 or
62. See id. at 93.
63. Id.
64. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18 (Eng.).
65. Id. at §§ l(2)(a)-(c).
66. Id. at §§ l(2)(d)-(e).
67. Id. at § 5(l).
68. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 101.
69. Gender Recognition Act, supra note 19.
70. See Robert E. Rains, Legal Recognition of Gender Change for Transsexual
Persons in the United Kingdom: The Human Rights Act 1998 and "Compatibility" with
European Human Rights Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333, 405-07 (2005).
71. See Stars Pack Elton 'Wedding Party, ' BBC News, Dec. 22, 2005, available at
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/entertainment/454
6670.stm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
72. See 15 V.S.A. §§ 1201 et seq. (2007)
73. See generally Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E. 2d 565 (Mass.
2004).
74. An Act to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage (Defense of Marriage
Act), Pub. L. No. 104-199 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
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by most American states with their state "Defense of Marriage" Acts.7 5
As Welstead and Edwards note, "[a]lthough the Government has
refuted strongly the idea that civil partnership is equivalent to same-sex
marriage, it has been unable to give any satisfactory explanation as to
how it differs from marriage; the explanations given lack any
credibility. 76  Indeed, the Gender Recognition Act 200477 does not
require a transsexual person to have undergone gender reassignment
surgery, if such surgery would be medically inappropriate, in order to
obtain a gender recognition certificate. 78 Thus, a pre-operative male-to-
female transsexual, possessing a valid gender recognition certificate, may
lawfully marry a male. This makes the U.K. Government's continued
insistence that it does not favor or allow same-sex marriage especially
difficult to comprehend.
In other areas, British family law appears to lag decades behind
American trends. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 still makes void any
agreement to restrict the right of the court to determine financial relief on
divorce. 79 American jurisdictions have long since generally abandoned
the notion that contracting adults cannot enter prenuptial agreements
setting forth their rights and duties upon divorce. 80 Yet, despite the
Matrimonial Causes Act, Family Law demonstrates that British courts
are slowly inching their way in recent years toward recognition of such
agreements. 81
Family Law can be read and enjoyed on a number of levels. It can
help American readers examine or reexamine American family law and
the explicit or implicit assumptions underlying it. It can help readers
question ideas which they might believe to be self-evident. It can
introduce American readers to a system of family law and of government
which is like ours, yet maintains many differences from the American
system. While it is not a manual for British family law practitioners, it
provides great detail in parsing key British family law statutes and cases,
so that an experienced American family lawyer can readily understand
how the British family law systems operate. This is a wonderful, lively
book, which may well have an impact not only on British family law, but
on the future development of family law in the United States as well.
75. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Act 124 of 1996, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102, 1704 (2006).
76. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 20. One supposes this is in the very
nature of political compromises on hot-button issues. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (discussing
the military's "Don't Ask Don't Tell" policy on homosexuality).
77. Gender Recognition Act, supra note 19.
78. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 21.
79. Matrimonial Causes Act, supra note 64.
80. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970).
81. WELSTEAD & EDWARDS, supra note 1, at 136-37.
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